This paper presents the first in-depth analysis of the changing composition of the global income rich and the rising representation of developing countries at the top of the global distribution. We construct global distributions of income between 1988 and 2012 based on both household surveys and the new top incomes data derived from tax records, which better capture the rich who are typically excluded from household surveys. We find that the representation of developing countries in the global top 1% declined until about 2002, but that since 2005 it has risen significantly. This coincides with a decline in global inequality since 2005, according to a range of measures. We compare our estimates of the country-composition and income levels of the global rich with a number of other sources -including Credit Suisse's estimates of global wealth, the Forbes World Billionaires List, attendees of the World Economic Forum, and estimates of top executives' salaries. To varying degrees, all show a rise in the representation of the developing world in the ranks of the global elite.
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Introduction
The growth of many low-and middle-income countries over the last three decadesamong them the so-called 'emerging economies' -have transformed both the shape of the global economy and the structures of global power. Growth in the incomes of the poor has implied substantial reductions in poverty, and the composition of the global 'middle class' (defined in various ways) has shifted towards developing countries (Cruz et al. 2015; Kharas 2010; AfDB 2011; Dayton-Johnson 2015; Jayadev et al. 2015 ). Yet while we have information on global poverty and the broader global income distribution, the top of the global distribution of income has so far remained unexamined, not least because "it can be very challenging identifying all but the highest profile of the super-rich" (Hay and Muller 2012: 83) . This paper aims to remedy that omission by using the new top incomes data along with global household surveys to analyse the composition and progress of the richest 1% globally, and compare them with the global top 10% and top 0.1%.
The wealth, as opposed to the income, of the very rich is tracked by several organizations including Forbes and Credit Suisse. Freund and Oliver (2016) find that Forbes's World Billionaire's list contained no Chinese billionaires in 1996, 2 in 2005 and 64 in 2010. The latest list for 2016 contains 251 Chinese, or 14% of the world's 1,810 billionaires -with 35% from outside the advanced economies more generally. 1 Research by the bank Credit Suisse covering the period 2000-2015 finds that the wealthiest 1% in the world owned 49% of global wealth in 2000, dropping to a trough of 44% in 2009, and then rising for the first time to 50% in 2015 (Davies et al. 2015: 99; Oxfam 2015: 2) . The international NGO Oxfam (2016) refers to this as an "escalating inequality crisis", and also find that "Eight men now own the same amount of wealth as the poorest half of the world" (Oxfam 2017: 2) .
Some of the global rich themselves have expressed concern about inequality. At the 2012 World Economic Forum meeting at Davos, "severe income disparity" was judged to be the single most likely global risk, and with one of the highest potential impacts. 2 Again at Davos in 2013, Christine Lagarde, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, stated that "[e]xcessive inequality is corrosive to growth; it is corrosive to society. I believe that the economics profession and the policy community have downplayed inequality for too long" (Lagarde 2013) .
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This neglect of inequality by most of the economics profession may be undergoing a correction with the rise in research on the incomes of the top 1% within countries Piketty 2007, 2010; Piketty 2014) . This literature focuses on estimating income shares of the top 1% within countries on the basis of tax records. Yet research on the global income-rich remains sparse. Milanovic (2011 Milanovic ( , 2016 gives brief sketches of the global top 1% based on household surveys from around the world. But the new research on the top 1% within countries indicates that household surveys are bad at capturing precisely the richest individuals, making such surveys a limited basis for analysis of the top of the income distribution. 3 The World Top Incomes Database (WTID) contains data on top income shares for countries estimated from income tax records. 4 In our earlier paper (Anand and Segal 2015) we combined these newly-available income tax data with household survey data to provide estimates of global inequality up to 2005. As one would expect, global inequality so estimated is higher than when it is measured using household surveys alone. Here we follow a similar procedure as before to construct a global income distribution using both income tax and household survey data. Building on our earlier dataset, we improve our procedure for imputing top 1% shares, we add an additional benchmark year of 2012, use the 2011 PPPs, and for each country-year we smooth the top 10% using a Pareto distribution, where the Pareto coefficient is estimated using both tax and survey data. This allows a much finer-grained analysis of the top of the global distribution, at the same time as taking into account the data on the top 1% within countries. In addition to the global distribution at PPP exchange rates, for comparison we also consider the global distribution using market exchange rates.
We use this global income distribution to estimate the progress of the global top 10%, top 1% and top 0.1%. We focus in detail on the global top 1% to determine its country composition, and its change over time. One reason to study the global top income groups is simply to discover the extent to which citizens of developing countries have succeeded in entering the ranks of the global rich. But the global rich are also worth studying as an international group, because the global top 1%, and even more so the global top 0.1%, share more than simply an income bracket.
The global rich, unlike the global 'middle class' or the global poor, have some claim to constituting a 'class' in a substantive sense. They meet and interact with each other across national boundaries. As a prerequisite of modern globalization, officials and 3 Milanovic (2016: 121) acknowledges an "inability to estimate accurately the highest incomes" on the basis of household survey data. 4 In January 2017 the WTID was superseded by the World Wealth and Income Database (http://wid.world/).
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business people travel and meet regularly to make deals, to trade, and to work. For instance, Beaverstock (2002: 525) argues that "expatriates are major agents in the accumulation and transfer of financial knowledge in the IFC [international financial centres], and that such processes are undertaken through expatriate global-local knowledge networks and other social practices". The international business meeting par excellence is the above-mentioned World Economic Forum at Davos, and we show that the composition of nationalities of those attending this meeting indicates an increase in the internationalization of the global elite, with a rising share coming from outside the advanced economies.
Moreover, increasingly the elites from non-rich countries buy property abroadChinese buyers alone spent more than US$52bn on foreign property in 2015 5 -and study in rich countries, acquiring qualifications, a shared language (typically English) and, it seems likely, some degree of a shared culture and attitudes. The British Council (2012: 15-17) reports that 3.5 million students studied abroad in 2009, up from 800,000 in the mid-1970s, and that the countries with the highest net outflows of students were China, India, South Korea, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Morocco and Vietnam. China and India alone contributed 21 percent to the total number of outbound students. To the extent that doing business together, sharing networks, and a foreign education foster common understanding and values, the global rich may more closely resemble a 'class' than do either a 'global middle class' or the global poor. 6 Below we show that the threshold for an individual to enter the global top 1% in 2012 is an annual income of about PPP$50,600 per capita household income, or PPP$202,000 for a family of four. We find that for many developed countries it includes the top 4% to 8% of their national income distribution. These income groups are likely to include senior professionals and some middle managers as well as business owners and 'supermanagers' (Piketty 2014: 291-303) . Among developing countries, Brazil has the largest share of its own population in the global top 1%, where 1.5% of its national distribution is in that group. For most developing countries the share is much smaller than 1%. We show that in emerging economies this group includes senior executives in large firms. Thus the global top 1% may be thought of as approximating the professional and technocratic elite -a global professional classrather than just the super-rich. 7 5 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-35957232 6 Robinson and Harris (2000: 18, cited in Hoffmann-Lange, 2012 ) went so far as to argue that the group of capitalists among the global elite (the "Transnational Capitalist Class") "is class conscious, has become conscious of its transnationality and has been pursuing a class project of capitalist globalization, as reflected in its global decision-making and the rise of a transnational state apparatus under the auspices of this fraction."
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An individual in the global top 0.1%, on the other hand, has a minimum of PPP$181,000 per capita household income, or about PPP$725,000 for a family of four. This comprises the top 1% in the US, and the top 0.3% -0.5% in Japan, Germany, France and the UK, the developed countries with the largest memberships of the club comprising the global top 0.1%. Even if less wealthy than the billionaires in the Forbes list, they are likely to wield significant power and influence.
The threshold for an individual to enter the global top 10% in 2012 was about PPP$15,300 per capita household income, or PPP$61,000 for a family of four. This income level would not count as 'rich' within a developed country: for most developed countries this group includes more than half their populations. For the US the top 60.4% of its population is in the global top 10%, and for Switzerland the corresponding figure is 71.2%. Of course, the global top 10% cannot include more than 10% of the population of every country, and for most developing countries the number will be much smaller than 10%.
We find that the advanced economies' share of the global rich has declined in the last decade, with a corresponding rise in that of the emerging economies. We also find a concurrent decline in global inequality. However, it is important to realize that these two outcomes need not go together. For instance, if an emerging economy that has some representation in the global top 1% were suddenly to become wholly egalitarian, that would reduce its share of the global rich and also unambiguously reduce global inequality. Relatedly, a country's membership of the global rich may expand if incomes grow throughout the national distribution while inequality remains constant, or if inequality increases with a rich minority (including those just below the threshold for the global top 1%) gaining more than the non-rich majority. Moreover, there is little reason to believe that previously under-represented groups will benefit from some of their number reaching the elite. Zweigenhaft (2001: 279) notes that despite observing a dramatic increase in the diversity of the US elite in terms of the participation of women and minorities since the 1950s, there is "no evidence of a kinder, gentler power elite in how it functions ... and in terms of wealth and income they are now further removed from the bulk of Americans 'below them'." The interests of a female executive, for instance, are more closely aligned with those of her firm's shareholders than with those of any female workers she may employ. Similarly, citizens of developing countries who reach the global elite may simply find themselves further removed from their own compatriots. 
Data and methodology
As in Anand and Segal (2015) , this paper combines two sets of data: national household surveys covering most of the global population and economy, and data on the income share of the top 1% in 28 countries from the World Top Incomes Database. Here we update in five respects the global income distribution estimated in Anand and Segal (2015) . First, in Anand and Segal (2015) we estimated the global distribution only up to 2005, whereas here we extend it to 2012. Second, we improve our imputation of top 1% shares, as described below. Third, we use the PPP conversion rates from the 2011 International Comparison Program (ICP), which represents an update and improvement over the 2005 ICP used in Anand and Segal (2015) . 8 Fourth, while our previous estimates used only PPP exchange rates to compare incomes across countries, here we also use market exchange rates -as discussed below. Fifth, we smooth the top decile of each country's income distribution by estimating a Pareto density function for this group.
Our household survey data up to 2005 are from Milanovic (2012), 'benchmarked' to the years 1988 , 1993 , 1998 , 2002 and 2005 s data are provided in quantiles -in most cases 20 income groups each comprising 5% of the population, i.e. vigintiles. As shown in Table 1 , we have a total of 668 country-years in our dataset. Of these, 128 country-years also have income tax data on the share of the top 1% of the population. These countries include the three most populous developing countries, all in Asia -China, India and Indonesia; three Latin American countries -Argentina, Colombia and Uruguay; one African country -South Africa; and all the G7 countries. See Appendix table A1 which shows these 128 country-years with income tax data on the top 1%.
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Our method for combining the top income data with household survey data follows our earlier procedure in Anand and Segal (2015) , where it is discussed in detail. The rationale for using income tax data for top 1% shares is that household surveys typically fail to capture the richest members of society (Atkinson et al. 2011) . For instance, the income share of the top 1% in China in recent years was about 7% in surveys and about 12% in tax data. 9 On this basis, we assume that household surveys are representative of only the bottom 99% of the population in each country, and that the true top 1% share is that given by the tax data. Hence we multiply the population in each income group in the household surveys by 0.99, and append the top 1% with its income share independently estimated from the tax data. Our assumption that the top 1% is excluded from the survey sample implies that mean incomes in the surveys are underestimated, and our procedure thus results in a corresponding increase in mean (and total) income for each country. 10 Source: Authors' calculations.
For countries with no top income data we impute top 1% shares using a pooled OLS regression as follows:
See Piketty et al (2016) . In their estimates of total income, including imputations for non-taxed capital income, the share of the top 1% is slightly higher still at about 13%. 10 The augmented total income is calculated by assuming that the top 1%'s share of 'control' income as given in WTID is equal to its share of this augmented total income.
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where i indexes the country, t indexes the year, topone is the income share of the top 1% (from WTID, in percentage points), topten is the income share of the top decile (from household surveys, in percentage points), meaninc is mean survey income, gov is government expenditure as a percent of GDP, and LAC is the regional dummy (for Latin America and the Caribbean). The regression observations are 128 country-years across 28 countries, and we obtained the following regression estimates (with standard errors in parentheses): All regressors are significant at the 1% level, and all have positive coefficients except for gov, which is negative. The R 2 is 0.66, implying that the regression explains twothirds of the variation in the share of the top 1%. For countries that have top income data in some but not all years we run a fixed-effects regression. See Appendix 2 for the complete table of regression results and a brief discussion on them.
Having imputed top 1% shares across our dataset, the final step in constructing our country-year distributions is to refine the top end of each distribution. For some countries the smallest groups at the top of the distribution are large in absolute terms compared with the size of the global top 1% or the global top 0.1%, whose composition we wish to identify. China is the obvious case, where the top 1% in 2012 has over 13 million people, or about 0.2% of the world's population. For a more fine-grained analysis, we estimate a Pareto coefficient for the top 10% for each country-year using the income shares of the top 10% and the top 1% (from the data, or estimated as above). We then break down the top 10% into 1,000 groups each of size 0.01% from percentile 90.00 to percentile 99.99, and use the estimated Pareto coefficients to calculate their respective income shares. 11
11 Atkinson (2007: 24) shows that / = ( / ) −1
where Si and Sj are the income shares of the top groups with population shares Hi and Hj, and a is the Pareto coefficient. We estimate the Pareto coefficient for each country-year by inverting this formula and using the income shares of the top 10% and top 1%. We then use the formula to partition the top 10% into 0.01% groups by using the top 10% share and the Pareto coefficient to calculate the implied shares of the top 9.99%, the top 9.98%, and so on, subtracting sequentially to obtain 0.01% shares. Thus the share of percentile 90.01 is equal to the share of the top 10% minus the share of the top 9.99%, the share of percentile 90.02 is equal to the share of the top 9.99% minus the share of the top 9.98%, and so on. Milanovic (2013, 2015) take a different approach to imputing top income shares in estimating global inequality between 1988 and 2008. 12 Whereas their main results are based on household surveys alone, they present alternative estimates which adjust higher incomes as follows. Following Banerjee and Piketty's (2010) finding that in India a significant part of the discrepancy between estimates of household final consumption expenditure in the national accounts (HFCE) and in household surveys can be accounted for by missing or under-reported top incomes, Milanovic (2013, 2015) attribute the difference between HFCE and survey incomes (when the latter is smaller than the former) entirely to the top decile of the national distribution in each country-year, and add this residual to the income of the top decile reported in the survey. They then smooth the top decile using a Pareto distribution, also following the procedure described in Atkinson (2007) . 13 Their method assumes that HFCE per capita is the correct measure of mean consumption expenditure (or income) when, and only when, it is larger than the corresponding survey mean. Segal (2008, 2015) provide reasons to prefer survey consumption expenditures (incomes) to HFCE from the national accounts. Recent revisions of national accounts estimates have also highlighted the unreliability of national accounts in developing countries, particularly in the poorer countries (Jerven 2013 ). Milanovic (2013, 2015) themselves point out that their assumption is "excessive" in some cases. For example, in 2008 in India -the country that motivated their procedure -they find the survey mean to be only 53% of HFCE per capita, so they attribute the remaining 47% of total HFCE entirely to the top decile. This adjustment does seem excessively large to us. Conversely, for China in both 1988 and 2008, HFCE is smaller than survey income, so no adjustment is made by these authors for under-reporting or under-sampling of top incomes.
Our estimates, on the other hand, suffer from the fact that top income data refer to pre-tax income of taxable units -which are usually individuals but in some cases are households -whereas household surveys refer either to post-tax disposable income or to consumption expenditure. By using the top income shares rather than the absolute incomes reported in the top incomes data we avoid conflating the levels of post-tax and pre-tax income, but differences between the distributions of pre-tax income and consumption expenditure or post-tax income will be a source of error in our estimates. 12 The following two paragraphs draw on Anand and Segal (2015) . 13 They calculate a Pareto coefficient for each country-year distribution on the basis of the unadjusted survey incomes in the ninth and tenth deciles and use it to estimate income shares for the income groups P90-P95 (i.e., percentile 90 to percentile 95), P95-P99 and P99-P100, yielding 12 income groups per country-year including deciles D1 to D9.
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More generally, as Bourguignon (2015: 45) observes, "procedures of estimating global standard of living inequality are approximate". Anand and Segal (2008: 87ff) describe a variety of sources of error inherent in any estimation of global inequality, including those due to errors in surveys, noncomparability of surveys, errors in national accounts, and errors in PPP exchange rates. As they also point out, there appears to be no procedure for estimating standard errors that would account for all these sources of error.
Results
Global inequality: declining at last?
We provide all estimates based on global distributions in PPP$, and in some cases we also provide estimates based on market exchange rates (FX$). For the measurement of global interpersonal income inequality there is limited justification in using the FX$ distribution (Anand and Segal 2008) . However, we have already mentioned that the global top 1% and global top 0.1% are likely to have more international lifestyles than the rest of the population, suggesting that a possiblysignificant portion of their expenditures should be priced at market exchange rates. 14 Thus a rich Indian who can enjoy the real consumption of the global top 1% in her own country will find her spending power severely curtailed when she travels to a developed country which may be three or four times more expensive at market exchange rates. Thus, for comparison we estimate the composition of the global top 10%, top 1% and top 0.1% in both FX$ as well as PPP$. inequality shown by the three inequality indices in figure 1 is driven by the fact that only deciles 9 and 10, but excluding the top 1% (and top 0.1%), saw their incomes grow by less than the global mean. Put another way, changes in the relative distribution were equivalent to transfers away from this group and towards others, both poorer (deciles 1 to 8) and richer (top 1%). Inequality among the bottom 6 deciles unambiguously increased with higher deciles showing faster growth. The dominant picture is one of 'middle-class growth', with deciles 4, 5 and 6 seeing the highest rates of growth at over 60% compared to a global average growth of 29%. While the global top 1% did better than average at 38% growth, and better than the rest of the 9 th and 10 th deciles, their incomes grew by less than that of any of the bottom 7 deciles. 18 The global top 0.1% did substantially better than average at 51%, but were still surpassed by deciles 2 to 7. Unsurprisingly, the US has the largest number of people in the global top 1%, with US citizens comprising 37.0% of this group in 2012 (table 4) . However, this is a substantial decline from its peak of 49.2% in 1998. The US is also the country with the highest share of its own population in the global top 1%: in 2012, 7.7% of the US population was in the global top 1% (see table 5 ). Switzerland comes in a close second with 7.1% of its population in the global top 1%, but since it is a much smaller country, these rich Swiss comprise only 0.9% of the global top 1%.
The developing country with the largest share of the global top 1% is Brazil, with 4.7% in 2012 -just above China's 4.6%. This is because it is not only large and relatively prosperous, but its very high level of inequality also implies that rich Brazilians are particularly rich (while the non-rich are correspondingly poor), allowing more of them to cross the threshold. China and Brazil were in fourth and fifth place in 2012, surpassing the three G7 countries Canada, Italy and the UK. India, with the second largest population in the world, just misses inclusion in tables 4 and 5 with the 21 st largest share of the population of the global top 1%, at 0.58%% in 2012, representing the top 0.3% of its national distribution. Over the period 1988 to 1998 only the top 0.1% of India's national distribution passed the threshold, comprising 0.2% of the global top 1%.
The global top 0.1% is dominated by the US, which comprised 48.7% of this group in 2012. China accounted for 4.2%, with Brazil's share dropping to 2.5%. 
Alternative identifications of the global elite: wealth, WEF, and executive compensation
We can also compare our global top income estimates at market exchange rates with the global wealth estimates produced for the bank Credit Suisse by Davies et al. (2012) , also at market exchange rates. However, while our data are provided in terms of household income per capita, giving children the same weight as adults, Davies et al. (2012: 6) use income per adult, with adults defined as individuals aged at least 20. First consider the thresholds for entering the global top 1% by income and the global top 1% by wealth. At market exchange rates we find the threshold for the global top 1% by annual income is US$51,400 per capita household income, or about US$206,000 for a family of two adults and two children. Davies et al. (2012: 92) find the threshold for the global top 1% in wealth to be US$710,000 per adult, or US$1.42 million for such a household. A real return of 5% on this wealth would be US$71,000, not nearly enough to reach the top 1% in the global income distribution at FX$. This reflects the fact that most of the income of rich, if not super-rich, households is salary or labour income. 20 We can also compare the country composition of the global top 1% by income and that of the global top 1% by wealth. Using market exchange rates, Davies et al. (2012: 101) find that in 2012 US residents comprised 35.7% of the global top 1% by wealth, China accounted for 3.3%, and India 0.5%. The US figure is similar to its value for the global top 1% by income at FX$ (table 4) . For China and India these shares by wealth are more than double their shares by income at FX$, which are respectively 1.5% (table 4) and 0.2% (not shown).
The pattern is different again at the very top of the global wealth distribution, according to Forbes's global estimates of the numbers of (wealth) billionaires. China's share of the world's billionaires in 2012 was substantially higher than its share of the global top 1% of income or of wealth -at 95 out of a total of 1,226, or 7.7% (Kroll 2012) . In 2016 China's share of billionaires rose to 14%, India's to 4.6%. These findings imply that both China and India are more represented in the global top 1% by wealth than by income, and more represented again at the level of global billionaires. This implies that their wealth distributions are particularly unequal at the very top, relative to other countries.
20 Piketty (2014: 277) finds that in France in 2005 capital income exceeds labour income only for those in the richest 0.1% of the income distribution. In 1932 this applied to the top 0.5%, and in the Belle Epoque to the entire top percentile. The figure of 5% as a typical real return on wealth is also proposed by Piketty. However, we would note that standard income surveys that include capital income do not account for the erosion of wealth by inflation and report nominal, not real, income from wealth, which is correspondingly higher (e.g. a return of 7% if the real return is 5% and inflation is 2%).
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Beyond the question of wealth, the World Economic Forum (WEF) meeting at Davos represents a different set of the global super-elite and includes policy makers as well as business people. We find that the composition of this group has changed less than membership of global top income groups. Figure 6 shows the share of attendees at the WEF with citizenship of advanced economies, and who are resident in advanced economies, for the period 2002-2016. The advanced economies' share of attendees has declined since its peak in 2006 from 78% by citizens or 80% by residents, to 74% for both in 2016. This decline coincides with the decline in their share of the global top 1% shown in figure 5 , but is less pronounced. We now turn to estimates of executive compensation to get a picture of the kinds of occupations that will secure an individual household a place in the global top 1%. The international recruitment agency Robert Walters runs surveys of salaries paid by large multinational and domestic firms, including in five of the developing countries in tables 4 and 5 -namely Brazil, China, Malaysia, South Africa and South Korea. 21 Salary ranges for the highest paid executives in each country are reported in table 6. We saw that in China, 0.22% of the population had an annual per capita household income above the threshold of ¥188,173 (table 5) , or about ¥753 thousand for a four-person household. A single earner would need ¥1.05m to achieve this income after tax, 22 which is significantly less than the salary (excluding bonus) of a chief financial officer (CFO) with 18 years' experience in accounting and finance, who could earn up to ¥2.5m, or a country manager in sales and marketing (for the category of 'consumer -retail and luxury') who could earn up to ¥2.2m (table 6) .
In Brazil, where 1.5% of the country's population are in the global top 1%, many senior executives are also likely to be included. There, to place a family of four in the global top 1% in 2012 required R$347,000 of disposable income (table 5) , or about R$480,000 before tax. This would be towards the lower range of salaries for a CFO with over 12 years of experience in an accounting and finance firm, or a chief operating officer (COO) in banking and financial services. It would be mid-range for the Chief Information Officer in an information technology firm or near the top end for the Director of a human resources firm.
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In Malaysia, where 1.5% of its population is in the global top 1%, the threshold is about MYR320,000 for a family of four, which could be achieved by a single earner with a gross salary of MYR484,000 before tax. This is near the top of the range for a CFO in accounting and finance; the top of the range for an experienced director in sales or marketing; and slightly more than a top-range salary for a Director in a human resources firm or a Chief Technology Officer in an IT firm. In South Africa the threshold would be about ZAR1.06m disposable income or ZAR1.65m gross, which is near the top end for a Corporate Finance CA, at the top end for an Audit/Tax/Accounting/Treasury/Senior Level Director in accounting, finance, banking or financial services, and about 15% above the top end for the General Manager of an engineering or natural resources firm. In South Korea, a family of four needs ₩185m disposable income, or ₩205m gross. This is a top-range salary for a CFO in accounting and finance or a Country Head in a small/medium sales and marketing firm. These data suggest that top executives in major firms in emerging economies tend to be around the borderline of the global top 1%, except in China where they are comfortably within that group. 
Conclusion
It is well established that the rise of the emerging economies has driven fundamental changes in the distribution of global income in terms of both poverty reduction and the changing composition of the global 'middle class'. We find that this change is also apparent in the ranks of the global rich, but to a moderate extent: the advanced economies, comprising only 14% of the world's population, still accounted for 77% of the global top 1% in 2012, at PPP$. But this was substantially lower than the 85-88% during 1988 to 2005. The rise of China is clear in these data, and in 2012 both China and Brazil surpassed three of the G7 countries in their shares of the global top 1%. The other giant of the developing world, India, has made limited incursions into the global top 1%, despite rapid economic growth over the past three decades. But both China and, to a lesser extent, India, are substantially more dominant at the level of wealth billionaires.
The turning point for the participation of the emerging economies in the global income rich appears to have been around 2005, which mirrors our finding that the advanced economies'
share of WEF attendees peaked in 2006 and has been on a declining trend since then. Moreover, we find that global inequality starts to decline around the same time, and that top 1% income shares within countries start to decline also from 2005. This trend was no doubt sharpened by the global financial crisis in 2008, which is having a lasting effect of slow growth in the advanced countries. But many developing countries were already converging with the developed economies before that point. As long as emerging economies continue to grow faster than the developed countries -which seems likely for the near future -we can expect both trends to continue.
The increasingly international lives of the global rich imply that, as a class, they probably have more in common with each other than other quantiles of the global income distribution. In emerging economies like China, Brazil, Malaysia and South Africa, the members of the global top 1% include top executives in large firms, in addition to wealthy capital-and landowning elites. Their professional lives will often involve international travel and deal-making associated with global commerce and investment, including (at the very top) at the World Economic Forum -fostering shared understandings and perhaps increasing awareness of common financial interests. We can only speculate about the consequences of the rising participation of the rich from poorer countries in international fora and the global elite. It is by no means clear that it will contribute to declining global inequality, or benefit the non-rich within developing countries. Senior executives and business owners from different countries may find that they share more interests with each other than with their own compatriots. Data on the income shares of the top 1% within countries were downloaded on 3 July 2015 from the World Top Incomes Database: http://topincomes.gmond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/. Estimates for China using income tax data were released on 26 December 2016 (Piketty et al. 2016 ) and were downloaded from the World Wealth and Income Database (beta), wid.world. We use the series for taxable (fiscal) income rather than for pre-tax national income to increase comparability with other countries. See Table A1 for the 128 country-years across 28 countries with both household survey and top 1% share data. Of these, 14 country-years across 8 countries have consumption surveys while the remainder are income surveys.
33 Our purpose is imputation rather than causal analysis, but we make brief remarks on the results of these regressions. The top decile share (from surveys) is positive and highly significant in all these regressions. This is not surprising, since it means that more inequality on one measure (the top decile share) is associated with more inequality on another measure (the top percentile share). Mean income (from surveys) has no significant simple correlation with the top percentile share (column 2), but when we add its square both regressors are highly significant (column 3), indicating a U-shape. Once we include other covariates meaninc is highly significant, and positive, but meaninc squared loses significance (not shown). On the other hand, the top 10% share from surveys is negatively associated with mean income: a regression of topten on meaninc produces a negative and highly significant (p=0.000) coefficient (not shown). One purely statistical explanation could be that the very rich find it easier to avoid taxes in poorer countries, which have weaker enforcement capacity, leading to greater underestimation of the top 1% share in poorer countries. This would imply an upward bias in the coefficient relating the top 1% share and mean income, and would not affect the survey-based estimate of the top 10% share. On the other hand, the hypothesis that mean income levels are causally associated with inequality has a long pedigree going back to Kuznets (1955) . Determining which mechanisms are at work is beyond the scope of this paper, but some association would not be surprising.
(1) Two possible explanations for the negative coefficient on government expenditure as a share of GDP are as follows. First, countries with larger government expenditure tend to have more redistribution, and may therefore also be countries with more egalitarian norms and less social acceptance of excessive pay at the top of the distribution. Second, higher government expenditure is generally associated with higher marginal tax rates for the rich, and Piketty (2014) argues that these reduce the incentive for highly-paid individuals to further bargain up their pre-tax incomes. The LAC dummy is positive and significant. This region is well known to have high levels of inequality, and this finding tells us that top 1% shares are higher even after controlling for top 10% shares. That is, inequality is unusually high within the top 10%, and not just between the top 10% and lower income groups.
